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Abstract
Economic agents with an increased sophistication sometimes use their advantage to exploit their
more naive counterparts. In public goods games played on networks, such an agent will attempt
to manipulate as many of his neighbors as possible to produce the public good. We study the
exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player in such games. We show the
existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal farsighted strategies in every network structure. In the
long run, the farsighted player’s effects are only felt locally. A simple dependence-withdrawal strategy
reaches the optimal outcome for every network if the starting state is unfavorable, and reaches it
for every starting state if the farsighted player is linked to all opponents. We characterize the lower
and upper bounds of long-run payoffs the farsighted player can attain in a given network and make
comparative statics with respect to adding a new link. The farsighted player always benefits from
linking to more opponents (sociability) and is always harmed by his neighbors linking to each other
(jealousy).
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1 Introduction
In many social and economic settings, agents produce goods for their own consumption with other agents
also benefitting from these goods as a form of externality. The typical free-rider problem results from
agents trying to benefit from goods produced by others while not producing any themselves. Oftentimes
the goods produced by one agent may affect some but not all other agents. This heterogeneity in the
interaction structure is typically captured by the local public goods model with the agents’ positions
being governed by a network.
Economic situations involving local public goods often pit players with different levels of sophisti-
cation, ability, or time horizon against one another. In such cases, players on a higher level may find it
profitable to engage in strategic free riding; rather than producing their best-response amounts of the
good, they produce less, sacrificing short-run consumption gains in order to manipulate their low-level
opponents to raise production and thus exploit their disadvantage. Depending on the specifics of the
game and the interaction structure, the strategies of manipulation and exploitation may be much more
complicated. In this paper, we study how these strategies and the gains from exploitation possibilities
depend upon the network. This approach allows us not only to find optimal methods of exploitation
and manipulation, but also to identify social environments in which such strategies produce the greatest
gains.
The class of local public goods games has an established theoretical literature, starting with Ballester
et al. (2006), and a wide applicability with contributions on the distribution of R&D costs between
interlinked firms (Ko¨nig et al., 2019), criminal activity (Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2004), peer effects
(Blume et al., 2010), and defense/counter-terrorism expenditure between allies (Sandler and Hartley,
1995, 2007).
For the situation where agents are homogenous in their reasoning, local public good games have
a rich recent literature. Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007) shows existence of Nash equilibria and that
equilibria with free riders are present in any non-trivial network. The follow-up paper, Bramoulle´ et al.
(2014) provides conditions such that stable Nash equilibria with respect to continuous best-response
dynamics exist. Allouch (2015) studies the effects of wealth redistribution. Galeotti and Goyal (2010)
and Choi et al. (2019) study players who can invest in both public good provision and building up their
connections. Goyal (2012) and Jackson and Zenou (2014) offer comprehensive overviews of additional
related models. A strand of literature focuses on the convergence of learning processes. It has been
shown that best-response dynamics converge to a single Nash equilibrium (Bervoets and Faure, 2019)
and that convergence may be achieved by a learning process with very little requirements on player
sophistication (Bervoets et al., 2016). Bayer et al. (2019) shows such convergence for a class of learning
processes. Parise and O¨zdaglar (2019) extends Bramoulle´ et al. (2014)’s results by the use of variational
inequalities.
In the spirit of Ellison (1997) we include a single player of increased sophistication into a population
of naive agents. In games of strategic complements such as coordination games, the addition of the
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more sophisticated player improves efficiency as coordination shifts towards a better Nash equilibrium
by performing strategic teaching (Camerer et al., 2002). In contrast, our game, a game of local strategic
substitutes, induces an exploitative behavior from the sophisticated player with no clear gains or losses
in efficiency. To be precise, we consider the presence of one farsighted player in a population of myopic
players. The farsighted player’s interest lies in the exploitation of the myopic players by maximizing his
neighbors’ production of the local public good, while minimizing his own efforts. Many recent papers
study farsightedness in general environments by the use of the farsighted stable set (Ray and Vohra,
2015) and its refinements (Dutta and Vohra, 2017; Bloch and van den Nouweland, 2019), as well as in
the context of coalition formation (Mauleon and Vannetelbosch, 2004), network formation (Dutta et
al., 2005; Page et al., 2005; Herings et al., 2009), and matching (Klaus et al., 2011). This approach can
be extended to the myopic-farsighted stable set to capture the interaction between these two types of
players (Herings et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2018). Our paper also studies such interactions.
To illustrate the manipulation and exploitation strategies of a farsighted player, consider a game
played by four players, 0, 1, 2, and 3. They inhabit a network in which all players are linked to all others
except for players 1 and 3, called the “kite network”, see Figure 1. Each player may exert costly efforts
into creating a perfectly substitutable good which is then freely accessible for all of their neighbors in
the network. The players have no efficient ways to exclude their neighbors from sharing the benefits
of their efforts, nor does the neighbors’ consumption harm the producer in any way, hence we think
of these goods as local public goods. We impose the normalization that marginal costs of production
equal marginal benefits of consumption when players consume 1 unit of the good. Thus, every player’s
best response is to set an effort that guarantees a consumption of 1, or set an effort of 0, if neighboring
efforts exceed 1. We consider two situations. In the first situation, player 2 exerts an effort of 1 and
the other three players exert 0 effort. In the second situation, players 1 and 3 exert an effort of 1 and
the others exert 0 effort, see Figure 1.
00
0 1
1 2
0 3
00
1 1
0 2
1 3
Figure 1: The kite network.
In both situations, every player is at a static best response as marginal costs either equal marginal
benefits for producers, while the free riders receive at least their target level of the local public good
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from neighboring producers. Therefore, despite the obvious inequalities between players, myopic players
would not deviate in either situation. Notice, however, that for player 0, the second situation is better
than the first, as he gets twice the amount of production from his neighbors without incurring extra
costs.
Assume that players 1, 2, and 3 are myopic, while player 0 is farsighted and is fully informed of
the opponents’ myopia. Suppose that, starting from the first situation, player 0 increases his efforts
to 1. Then once player 2, being the only other producer, is able to change his own effort level, he
will cease production completely. Now suppose that player 0 ceases as well, reaching a state with no
effort from any player. Then, depending on the timing of the others’ reactions, two outcomes may be
reached. If player 2 reacts to the new situation first, we return to the first situation, upon which player
0 may repeat the process. If player 1 (player 3) reacts first, he will raise his efforts to 1, upon which
only player 3 (player 1) can deviate profitably by doing the same, reaching the second situation. Thus,
player 0 has a way to secure a long-run consumption level of 2, the maximum long-run consumption
he can freely receive in this network. The strategy giving the improvement is simple, first produce for
his neighborhood, creating dependence, followed by a withdrawal.
It is clear that a farsighted player’s ability to free ride on as many of his neighbors as possible
depends on his position in the network; given the first situation, adding the link {1, 3} would mean
that player 0 cannot improve upon a consumption of 1, while removing the link {0, 2} would mean that
his consumption needs will have to be covered through his own efforts as both of his neighbors are kept
at 0 effort level; they are “blocked” by player 2’s efforts, see Figure 2.
00
0 1
1 2
0 3
00
0 1
1 2
0 3
Figure 2: Two variants of the kite network with a link added and a link removed. Both harm player 0’s prospects
for exploitation.
We study exploitation strategies of the above kind in general spatial structures where one farsighted
player faces a myopic population. Our setting is a dynamic one, taking place in discrete time. In
every period a randomly selected player has a chance to revise his exerted effort. Once he does, period
payoffs are awarded, and a new random player receives a revision opportunity. Myopic players maximize
their instantaneous payoffs, while the farsighted player maximizes the discounted sum of instantaneous
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payoffs.
Our contributions are as follows: Using classic results of Markov Decision Processes we show exis-
tence of optimal exploitation strategies by the farsighted player for every network structure. In addition,
we also show existence of equilibrium in outcomes; under equilibrium play there exist a set of rest points
of the dynamic process. This set does not necessarily coincide with the set of Nash equilibria in the
static game since (1) some Nash equilibria of the static game can be improved upon by the farsighted
player as seen above and (2) effort profiles in which myopic players are playing their current best re-
sponses may be profitable for the farsighted player even if he is not at his best response. Thus the set
of absorbing effort profiles is neither a subset nor a superset of the set of Nash equilibria of the static
game.
Next, we find that the farsighted player’s effect on the population is only felt locally in the long run;
every myopic player who does not share a neighbor with the farsighted player, or isn’t a neighbor himself
will, in time, settle for a constant effort output. The reason behind this is that autonomous islands
of myopic producers always emerge outside the neighborhood of the farsighted player surrounded by a
layer of free riders sustained entirely by the island. These free riders dampen any effects arriving from
the outside thus negating the farsighted player’s influence. Since a farsighted player’s long-run effects
are local, our results are robust for multiple farsighted players, provided that they appear sparsely
enough in the network.
In the kite network, the farsighted player’s optimal outcome is to exploit the myopic neighbors
belonging to the maximum independent set of his neighborhood and this outcome can be reached by a
simple dependence-withdrawal strategy. We confirm the first fact for every network, thus characterizing
an upper bound of the farsighted player’s prospects for exploitation. However, for general network
structures, exploiting a maximum independent set of the neighborhood is not always attainable for some
starting states, e.g., the right side of Figure 2. We define the lower bound of farsighted player’s prospects
as the minimum long-run payoff they can guarantee from any starting state in the given network and
characterize it as the maximum unblocked independent set of the farsighted player’s neighborhood. We
show that the value of the lower bound is always reachable using a dependence-withdrawal strategy.
Thus, a very simple strategy does no worse than the optimal strategy in unfavorable starting states.
It is natural to ask how the farsighted player’s prospects are changed trough changes in the network.
We answer this by considering the comparative statics of a new link to the upper and lower bounds.
We find that adding a link to connect the farsighted player to an additional neighbor always weakly
increases both the upper and lower bounds, while adding link between any two of his neighbors always
weakly decreases them. Thus, the farsighted player has a preference to have a direct link with as many
opponents as possible and a preference for his neighbors to be unlinked. We thus found an interesting
justification for two human emotions which drive the formation of social connections; sociability, the
drive to form as many links as possible, and jealousy, the inclination to be in exclusive relationships,
both help farsighted agents to maximize their exploitative potential.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces local public goods games, introduces the
dynamic and stochastic components of the model, shows the existence of equilibrium strategies, and
demonstrates the uniqueness of the farsighted player’s equilibrium payoffs. Section 3 narrows down
the effort profiles that can be recurrent and shows the existence of absorbing effort profiles. The main
result of Section 4 establishes that the in the long run the farsighted player has only local impact.
Section 5 presents the lower and upper bounds on the payoffs of the farsighted player and contains our
comparative statics results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We first consider the static local public goods game Γ = (I0, X, pi), which is determined by the primitives
(n,G, (fi)i∈I0 , (γi)i∈I0 , d). We then go on to extend this model to a dynamic game Γ′ = (I0, X,Ω, q, δ)
in discrete time, which involves additional primitives (q, δ).
There are n ≥ 1 myopic players, which we collect in the set I = {1, . . . , n}. There is also a farsighted
player, denoted by player 0. Let the set I ∪ {0} be denoted by I0. A network structure, characterized
by the binary, symmetric matrix G, represents the local interactions between the players. For i, j ∈ I0,
gij = 1 means that players i and j are connected, while gij = 0 means that they are not. As a notational
convention, we assume gii = 1 for all i ∈ I0. For a player i ∈ I0, the set Ni = {j ∈ I0 \ {i} : gij = 1}
is called i’s neighborhood. For J ⊆ I0, let NJ = {i ∈ I0 \ J : gij = 1 for some j ∈ J} denote the
neighborhood of a set of players J . Finally, for i ∈ I0, let N i = Ni ∪ {i} and, for J ⊆ I0, let
NJ = NJ ∪ J .
Let d be a positive integer and Z = {0, 1/d, 2/d, . . .}. The set of possible effort levels of a player
i ∈ I0 is given by Xi = Z. For J ⊆ I0, we define XJ =
∏
j∈J Xj . We also use the notation X for the
set XI0 and, for i ∈ I0, X−i for the set XI0\{i}. For an effort profile x ∈ X and a set of players J ⊆ I0,
we denote by x(J) =
∑
i∈J xi the sum of efforts by the players in J . For i ∈ I0, the value x(N i) is
called player i’s consumption at profile x and is denoted by ci(x) (also called a neighborhood vector in
Allouch and King (2019)).
The players are engaged in a local public goods game Γ = (I0, X, pi) with payoff functions pii : X → R
that are given by
pii(x) = fi(ci(x))− γixi,
where γi ∈ R+ and the functions fi : Z → R+ satisfy the following properties:
1. fi(0) = 0.
2. fi is monotonically increasing.
3. fi(c˜i)− fi(c˜i − 1/d) ≥ fi(c˜i + 1/d)− fi(c˜i) for all c˜i ∈ Z \ {0}.
4. fi(1)− fi(1− 1/d) > γi/d and fi(1 + 1/d)− fi(1) < γi/d.
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For i ∈ I0 and x ∈ X, the value fi(ci(x)) is called the benefits enjoyed by player i from his consumption
ci(x) in profile x. The function fi is called the benefit function of player i, while the parameter γi is
the cost of one unit of effort for player i. Let pi(x) denote the vector of payoffs (pi0(x), . . . , pin(x)) in
effort profile x.
The four properties of the benefit function respectively mean (1) the benefits of consuming zero
equal zero, (2) monotonicity, (3) concavity, and (4) the existence of an optimal effort level, above which
the marginal cost of effort is larger than the marginal benefit of consumption. These properties are
standard in the discussion of local public good games. The optimal effort levels are the same for all
players and, by (4), their value is normalized to one.
For the game where efforts are chosen from R+, it is possible to give a constructive proof for the
existence of Nash equilibria, see Goyal (2012). The same construction can be used to show the existence
of Nash equilibria in the game Γ, where efforts are chosen from the discrete set Z. Take any player
j0 ∈ I0 and define x∗j0 = 1. For every i ∈ Nj0 , define x∗i = 0. If N j0 = I0, then it is easy to verify that
x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium and we are done. Otherwise, take any player j1 ∈ I0 \ N j0 and define
x∗j1 = 1. For every i ∈ Nj1 \N j0 , define x∗i = 0. If N j0∪N j1 = I0, then it is easy to verify that x∗ ∈ X is
a Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, take any player j2 ∈ I0 \ (N j0 ∪N j1) and define x∗j2 = 1. Repeating this
argument finitely many times results in a Nash equilibrium x∗. We have therefore shown the following
result.
Proposition 2.1. The game Γ has a Nash equilibrium.
We are interested in the dynamic behavior of a farsighted player acting against a set of myopic players
in the dynamic extension of Γ, denoted by Γ′. The dynamics take place in discrete time, indexed by
t = 1, 2, . . .. The game starts with an arbitrary effort profile, x0 ∈ X. Let q = (q0, . . . , qn) ∈ Rn+1 be
a strictly positive vector with
∑
i∈I0 qi = 1. In every period t = 1, 2, . . . , player i ∈ I0 becomes the
active player with probability qi and is denoted by i
t. The active player it gets a revision opportunity
and updates his effort level, whereas the other players keep their effort level from the previous period,
leading to effort profile xt and instantaneous payoffs pi(xt) in period t.
A state is characterized by the previous period’s effort profile and the active player. The set of
states is denoted by Ω = X × I0. For a given effort profile x ∈ X, the effort profile that results if a
player i ∈ I0 updates his effort level to z ∈ Xi is denoted by (z, x−i).
Fix T ≥ 1. For time periods 1 ≤ t ≤ T , states ωt = (xt−1, it) ∈ Ω, and choices zt ∈ Xit , a sequence
hT = (ω1, z1, ω2, z2, . . . , ωT−1, zT−1, ωT ) such that for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T it holds that
xt−it = x
t−1
−it and x
t
it = z
t (1)
is called a T -long history. Let HT denote the set of T -long histories and H =
⋃
T∈NH
T denote the set
of finite histories. For a player i ∈ I0, an effort profile x ∈ X, and a state ω ∈ Ω, let HTi , HTx , and
HTω denote the set of T -long histories for which the last active player i
T is equal to i, the last effort
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profile xT−1 is equal to x, and the last state ωT is equal to ω, respectively. Define Hi =
⋃
T∈NH
T
i ,
Hx =
⋃
T∈NH
T
x , and Hω =
⋃
T∈NH
T
ω .
A strategy of a player i ∈ I0 is a function s˜i : Hi → Xi. For a history h ∈ Hi, the value s˜i(h) is the
effort chosen by player i after observing history h. Denote the set of strategies of player i by S˜i and let
S˜ =
∏
i∈I S˜i denote the set of strategy profiles.
The transitions between the states are governed by a distribution Q : Ω×Z → ∆(Ω). The probability
that state ω′ follows ω if choice z is made equals Q(ω′|ω, z). For every x, x′ ∈ X, i, i′ ∈ I0, and z ∈ Xi
we have
Q((x′, i′)|(x, i), z) =
{
qi′ if x
′ = (z, x−i)
0 otherwise.
For strategy profile s˜ and a T -long history h ∈ HT , let ut0(h, s˜) denote the expected instantaneous payoff
that player 0 receives in period T+t−1. For example, it holds that u10(h, s˜) = pi0(s˜iT (h), xT−1−iT ) = pi0(xT ).
Player 0’s utility is given by the sum of discounted expected instantaneous payoffs, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is
the discount factor:
U0(h, s˜) =
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ut0(h, s˜).
A myopic player i ∈ I cares only about his instantaneous payoffs, so for x ∈ X and h ∈ HT , his utility
function is defined by
Ui(h, s˜) = pii(s˜iT (h), x
T−1
−iT ).
We start by analyzing the subgame perfect equilibria of the game Γ′, formally defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (SPE). A strategy profile s˜∗ ∈ S˜ is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of Γ′ if for
every player i ∈ I0, for every history h ∈ H, and for every strategy s˜i ∈ S˜i it holds that
Ui(h, s˜
∗) ≥ Ui(h, (s˜i, s˜∗−i)).
Let S˜∗ denote the set of SPEs. For i ∈ I0, the strategy b˜i ∈ S˜i such that
b˜i(h) = max{0, 1− x(Ni)}, x ∈ X, h ∈ H(x,i),
is called the best-responder strategy of player i. Under the best-responder strategy, player i exerts an
amount of effort such that his consumption ci(x) is equal to 1, except when the neighbors of player i
together exert more effort than 1, in which case player i does not contribute at all and enjoys a level of
consumption above 1.
The next proposition states that at every SPE the myopic players use the best-responder strategy.
Proposition 2.3. For every s˜∗ ∈ S˜∗, for every i ∈ I, it holds that s˜∗i = b˜i.
Proof. The lemma follows immediately from property (4) of the benefit functions (fi)i∈I . 
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Note that the best-responder strategy depends only on the last state in a history. Strategies that
satisfy this criterion are called stationary strategies. More formally, for i ∈ I0, a strategy s˜i ∈ S˜i is
called stationary if there is a function si : X → Xi such that, for every x ∈ X, for every h ∈ H(x,i),
it holds that s˜i(h) = si(x). The value si(x) is player i’s choice at effort profile x. The collection of
such functions si is denoted by Si. From now on, we represent a stationary strategy of player i by an
element of Si. The member of Si corresponding to the best-responder strategy b˜i of player i is denoted
by bi. The effort profile that results from x after player i uses the best-responder strategy is denoted
by βi(x). Let S =
∏
i∈I0 Si denote the set of stationary strategy profiles.
A subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4 (SSPE). A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary
strategies (SSPE) of Γ′ if it is an SPE.
Let the set of SSPEs be denoted by S∗. It follows from Proposition 2.3 that, for every s∗ ∈ S∗, for
every i ∈ I, we have s∗i = bi. In Proposition 2.5 we show that an SSPE exists in this game.
Proposition 2.5. The game Γ′ has an SSPE.
Proof. Consider the following Markov Decision Process (MDP) with set of states Ω. Player 0 acts as
the decision maker. The process that drives the transition to a new state from ω to ω′, given choice
z, is Q(ω′|ω, z). Rewards in state ω = (x, i) ∈ Ω are given by pi0(x) and the discount factor is equal
to δ. We assume that in every state (x, i) ∈ Ω for which i 6= 0, nature chooses bi(x). A policy of the
decision maker is a function p˜ : H0 → X0 and a stationary policy of the decision maker is represented
by a function p : X → X0. The collection of policies is denoted by P˜ and the collection of stationary
policies by P.
According to the standard theory of MDPs, see for instance Puterman (1994), the MDP has an
optimal policy which is stationary, say p∗ ∈ P. Since the reward at history h ∈ H0 under the policy
p˜ ∈ P is defined as
Vp˜(h) = U0(h, (p˜, b˜I)),
we have that p∗ achieves a total discounted reward equal to
max
p˜∈P˜
Vp˜(h) = max
s˜0∈S˜0
U0(h, (s˜0, b˜I)).
It follows that player 0 has no profitable deviation from p∗. Since the players in I have no profitable
deviation from b˜I , it follows that (p
∗, bI) ∈ S is an SSPE. 
Proposition 2.5 makes use of the fact that the optimal behavior of a myopic player i ∈ I is to use
strategy bi, independent of the strategy used by other players. Therefore, we can model the decision
problem of the farsighted player as an MDP with the decisions by the myopic players treated as moves
by nature according to bI . It is well-known that there exists an optimal policy in this MDP which is
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stationary. Such an optimal stationary policy together with the strategies bI constitutes an SSPE of
Γ′. Note that if δ is small, we have a unique SPE equal to bI0 and therefore a unique SSPE. In this
paper, we are mainly interested in the case where δ is close to 1.
Proposition 2.6 shows that every SPE yields the same expected utility for player 0, conditional on
reaching any history h ∈ H.
Proposition 2.6. For any two SPE strategy profiles r˜, s˜ ∈ S˜ of game Γ′ it holds that, for every h ∈ H,
U0(h, r˜) = U0(h, s˜).
Proof. Let r˜, s˜ ∈ S˜ be two SPE strategy profiles. By Proposition 2.3 it holds that r˜I = s˜I = b˜I . It
holds that r˜0 and s˜0 are both optimal policies of the MDP constructed in the proof of Proposition 2.5.
Therefore, it holds for every h ∈ H that
U0(h, r˜) = Vr˜0(h) = Vs˜0(h) = U0(h, s˜).

Propositions 2.5 and 2.6 establish the existence of an SSPE and the uniqueness of SPE payoffs of the
farsighted player for any network structure. Proposition 2.6 implies that there is no loss of generality
in payoff terms to only consider stationary strategies as far as the farsighted player is concerned. Note,
however, that the myopic players’ payoffs may not be the same in each SSPE as the farsighted player
might have multiple best strategies that are payoff equivalent for him, but not for the myopic players.
3 Absorbing effort profiles
In this section we define absorbing effort profiles, consider their relation to Nash equilibria of the static
game Γ and show the existence of absorbing effort profiles.
We start out by defining two standard concepts of graph theory, cliques and independent sets, as
well as a useful tool for our analysis, called pillar sets.
Definition 3.1 (Cliques). A non-empty set of players J ⊆ I0 is a clique if for every i, j ∈ J we have
gij = 1.
Every single player constitutes a clique as does every pair of neighbors.
Definition 3.2 (Independent sets). Let J ⊆ I0. The set of players K ⊆ J is an independent set of J
if for every i, j ∈ K with i 6= j it holds that gij = 0. The set M ⊆ J is a maximal independent set of J
if it is an independent set of J and J ⊆ NM . The set M ⊆ J is a maximum independent set of J if it
is an independent set of J and there is no other independent set K of J for which |K| > |M |.
Notice that for every J ⊆ I0, every maximum independent set of J is also a maximal independent set
of J .
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We introduce pillar sets to serve as an upper bound on the total efforts of a subset of myopic
players. The idea is the following: We pick a myopic player with positive effort, called a pillar, whose
neighborhood without the farsighted player has a total effort of at most one. We remove the player
and his myopic neighbors from the network. We find another such player and repeat until we run out
of players with positive effort. The pillar set contains the players selected by this process. The name
pillar is chosen for the players’ property of supporting at most 1 unit of effort. For an effort profile
x ∈ X, we let I+(x) = {i ∈ I : xi > 0} and I0(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = 0} denote the myopic contributors and
free riders in effort profile x, respectively.
Definition 3.3 (Pillar set). Let J ⊆ I and x ∈ X. The maximal independent set P of J ∩ I+(x) is a
pillar set of J in x if there exists an enumeration of the elements of P , (i1, . . . , i|P |), such that for every
k′ ∈ {1, . . . , |P |} we have x((J ∩N ik′ ) \
⋃k′−1
k=1 N ik) ≤ 1.
We denote the collection of pillar sets of J in effort profile x by Px(J). Pillar sets may not exist,
for instance when every player has an effort level exceeding 1, in which case Px(J) = ∅. In case
J ∩ I+(x) = ∅, it holds that P = ∅ is a pillar set and Px(J) = {∅}. The cardinality of a pillar set
P ∈ Px(J) provides an upper bound on the total effort x(J) exerted by the players in the set J.
By Definition 3.3, two properties immediately follow.
1. Inclusion. Let J, J ′ ⊆ I with J ⊆ J ′ and x ∈ X be given. If P ∈ Px(J ′) and P ⊆ J, then
P ∈ Px(J).
2. Addition. Let J, J ′ ⊆ I and x ∈ X be given. If P ∈ Px(J), P ′ ∈ Px(J ′), and P ∪ P ′ is an
independent set, then P ∪ P ′ ∈ Px(J ∪ J ′).
Let X ′ ⊆ X denote the set of effort profiles that accommodate a pillar set for every J ⊆ I, so Px(J) 6= ∅
for every J ⊆ I. It is possible to give examples such that Px(I) 6= ∅, whereas for some J ⊆ I it holds that
Px(J) = ∅. For instance, for the four-player line network and effort profile x in Figure 3, P = {1, 3}
is a pillar set of I = {1, 2, 3} in x when using the enumeration (1, 3), but there is no pillar set of
J = {2, 3} ⊂ I in x. Since the effort of the farsighted player does not matter for the definition of a
pillar set, we can write X ′ = X0 ×X ′I . Notice that X ′I is a finite set.
0
0
0.5
1
0.5
2
1
3
Figure 3: Example of an effort profile that accommodates a pillar set for the full set of myopic players, but not
for some subset of it.
Proposition 3.5 states that if every myopic player i ∈ I uses the best-responder strategy bi, then
the set X ′ is reachable from any initial state. Moreover, effort levels will stay within the set X ′ once it
is reached. We next give a formal definition of reachability.
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Definition 3.4 (Reachability). Let x, x′ ∈ X and s ∈ S. Effort profile x′ is reachable from x in s if
there is T ∈ N and a T -long history h = (ω1, z1, ω2, z2, . . . , ωT−1, zT−1, ωT ) ∈ HT with x0 = x and
xT−1 = x′ and updates are made in accordance with strategy profile s, i.e., for every t ∈ {1, . . . , T −1},
zt = sit(x
t−1).
If x′ is reachable from x in s, then we write x -s x′. We write x ∼s x′ if x -s x′ and x′ -s x both hold
and x ≺s x′ if x -s x′ and x′ 6-s x. Clearly, ∼s is an equivalence relation. An equivalence class of ∼s
containing x is a recurring set in s if there exists no x′ ∈ X for which x ≺ x′. The recurring set in s
that contains the effort profile x ∈ X is denoted by [x]s. If an effort profile y ∈ X belongs to [x]s for
some x ∈ X, then we say that y is recurring. Let Rs(x) = {x′ ∈ X : x -s x′} denote the set of effort
profiles that are reachable from x in s. For J ⊆ I0, let RJs (x) ⊆ Rs(x) denote the set of effort profiles
that are reachable from x in s if updates are restricted to the players in J.
Proposition 3.5 (Recurrent effort profiles admit pillar sets.). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}.
1. Reachability: For every x ∈ X \X ′ it holds that RIs(x) ∩X ′ 6= ∅.
2. No exit: For every x ∈ X ′ it holds that Rs(x) ⊆ X ′.
Proof. To prove Reachability, we show that once every myopic player has been active at least once, the
resulting effort profile must be in X ′. Let ((x0, 1), b1(x0), . . . , (xn−1, n), bn(xn−1), (xn, in+1)) ∈ Hn+1
be such that x0 ∈ X \X ′. The proof constructs a pillar set of xn for an arbitrary J ⊆ I.
Fix J ⊆ I. If J ∩ I+(xn) = ∅, then the empty set is a pillar set of J in xn. Otherwise, let j1 be the
highest numbered player in J ∩ I+(xn). Since xj1j1 = bj1(xj1−1) and x
j1
j1
> 0, it holds that cj1(x
j1) = 1.
Since j1 is the highest numbered player in J ∩ I+(xn), we have
1 = cj1(x
j1) ≥ cj1(xn) = xn(N j1) ≥ xn(J ∩N j1).
If J \N j1 = ∅, then it holds that {j1} ∈ Pxn(J). Otherwise, let j2 be the highest numbered player in
(J \N j1) ∩ I+(xn). It holds that
1 = cj2(x
j2) = xj2(N j2) ≥ xj1((J ∩N j2) \N j1) ≥ xn((J ∩N j2) \N j1).
If J \ (N j1 ∪N j2) = ∅, then it holds that {j1, j2} ∈ Pxn(J). Otherwise, we continue as before and find
a pillar set {j1, . . . , jk} ∈ Pxn(J) in k ≤ n steps.
We now prove the No exit part. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists T ∈ N and a (T + 1)-
long history h = (ω1, z1, . . . , ωT , zT , ωT+1) ∈ HT+1 with x0 ∈ X ′ and xT ∈ X \X ′. Since xT ∈ X \X ′,
there exists J ⊆ I such that PxT (J) = ∅.
First, consider the case |J | = 1, i.e., J = {j}. If xTj = 0, then ∅ ∈ PxT (J), leading to a contradiction.
If 0 < xTj ≤ 1, then {j} ∈ PxT (J), leading to a contradiction. If xTj > 1 and j /∈ {i1, . . . , iT }, then
x0j = x
T
j > 1, so Px0({j}) = ∅, a contradiction to x0 ∈ X ′. If xTj > 1 and j ∈ {i1, . . . , iT }, then
xTj ∈ [0, 1], a contradiction to xTj > 1.
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Now assume |J | = k for some k > 1 and for every J ′ ⊆ I with |J ′| < k it holds that PxT (J ′) 6= ∅. If
there exists j ∈ J with xTj = 0, then consider J ′ = J \ {j}. We have that PxT (J) = PxT (J ′) 6= ∅, where
we use that |J ′| < k, leading to a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that J ⊆ I+(xT ).
If J∩{i1, . . . , iT } = ∅, then for every j ∈ J we have x0j = xTj . It follows that ∅ 6= Px0(J) = PxT (J) =
∅, a contradiction. Consequently, it holds that J ∩ {i1, . . . , iT } 6= ∅.
Let j be the last player in (i1, . . . , iT ) who belongs to J. By this choice, we must have xT (N j∩J) ≤ 1.
Consider the set of players J ′ = J \ N j . Since |J ′| < k, it holds that PxT (J ′) 6= ∅. Let P ′ ∈ PxT (J ′).
Then, since P ′ ∩ N j = ∅, by the addition property of pillar sets, we have P ′ ∪ {j} ∈ PxT (J), which
leads to a contradiction. 
Remark 3.6. By the proof of Proposition 3.5, two statements follow:
1. The set X ′ is reachable from any effort profile via at most n updates, hence it will be reached
almost surely for any starting state.
2. For a fixed x0 ∈ X0, once the game reaches {x0} × X ′I , it cannot leave this set unless player 0
updates. The proof is identical to that of the No exit part of Proposition 3.5.
As a consequence of Proposition 3.5, for any strategy profile s ∈ S0 × {bI}, we must have [x]s ⊆ X ′.
Let
X∗ = {x ∈ X | ∀i ∈ I, xi = bi(x)},
denote the set of effort profiles where every myopic player i ∈ I is at his best response, so ci(x) = 1 if
xi > 0, and ci(x) ≥ 1 if xi = 0. The set X∗ contains all Nash equilibria of the static game Γ.
Definition 3.7 (Absorbing effort profile). Let s0 ∈ S0. An effort profile x ∈ X is absorbing for s0 if
x ∈ X∗ and s0(x) = x0. The set of absorbing effort profiles for s0 is denoted by A(s0).
In other words, an effort profile is absorbing for a given strategy s0 ∈ S0 if every myopic player is at
his best response and the farsighted player also does not deviate from it. Clearly, we have A(s0) ⊆ X∗.
It is also easily observed that A(b0) corresponds to the set of Nash equilibria of the static game Γ.
We now identify a profile x∗ ∈ X that is absorbing for every SSPE. Let M be a maximum in-
dependent set of N0. Let M
′ ⊇ M be a maximal independent set of I0. Such a set M ′ can be easily
constructed, by adding a player who is not in NM to M, then adding a player outside the neighborhood
of M and the new player, and so on, until we run out of players. Let xM
′ ∈ X be defined as xM ′i = 1 if
i ∈M ′ and xM ′i = 0 if i ∈ I0 \M ′. Notice that N0 6= ∅ implies 0 /∈M ′ and N0 = ∅ implies 0 ∈M ′. Let
Xa be the non-empty set of effort profiles xM
′
that can be constructed in this way, i.e., the set of effort
profiles xM
′
such that M ′ is a maximal independent set of I0 and M ′ ∩N0 is a maximum independent
set of N0.
Proposition 3.8 (Existence of absorbing effort profiles). For every SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗ it holds that Xa ⊆
A(s∗0). Moreover, it holds that Xa ⊆ A(b0).
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Proof. Assume N0 = ∅. Let M ′ be a maximal independent set of I0. It holds that xM ′0 = 1. Since N0 = ∅,
player 0 achieves the highest possible instantaneous payoff at xM
′
. It also holds that pi0(x) < pi0(x
M ′)
whenever x0 6= 1. It follows that for every s∗ ∈ S∗ it holds that s∗0(xM
′
) = xM
′
0 = 1. Consider a player
j ∈ I with xM ′j = 1. By the definition of an independent set, it holds that xi = 0 for every i ∈ Nj , so
bj(x
M ′) = xM
′
j = 1. Finally, consider a player j ∈ I with xM
′
j = 0. Since M
′ is a maximal independent
set, it holds that j ∈ NM ′ , so there is i ∈ Nj with xM ′i = 1. It follows that bj(xM
′
) = xM
′
j = 0. We have
shown that xM
′ ∈ A(s∗0). Since b0(xM
′
) = xM
′
0 = 1, we also have x
M ′ ∈ A(b0).
Assume N0 6= ∅. Let M be a maximum independent set of N0 and M ′ ⊇M be a maximal indepen-
dent set of I0. It holds that x
M ′
0 = 0. Since x
M ′ ∈ X ′, it holds by Proposition 3.5 that Rs∗(xM ′) ⊆ X ′.
Since the cardinality of a pillar set of N0 is an upper bound on the total effort as made by the play-
ers in N0 and M is a pillar set of N0 with the highest cardinality, it holds that, for every x ∈ X ′,
pi0(x) ≤ pi0(xM ′). It also holds that pi0(x) < pi0(xM ′) whenever x0 > 0. It follows that, for every
s∗ ∈ S∗, s∗0(xM
′
) = xM
′
0 = 0. Consider a player j ∈ I with xM
′
j = 1. By the definition of an independent
set, it holds that xi = 0 for every i ∈ Nj , so bj(xM ′) = xM ′j = 1. Finally, consider a player j ∈ I with
xM
′
j = 0. Since M is a maximal independent set, it holds that j ∈ NM ′ , so there is i ∈ Nj with xM
′
i = 1.
It follows that bj(x
M ′) = xM
′
j = 0. We have shown that x
M ′ ∈ A(s∗0). Since b0(xM
′
) = xM
′
0 = 0, we also
have xM
′ ∈ A(b0). 
Proposition 3.8 identifies an effort profile which is both acceptable for the myopic players, as they
are playing best responses, and for the farsighted player, who gets the maximum instantaneous payoff
attainable from this position. By this construction we show not only that the set of absorbing effort
profiles is non-empty for every SSPE of Γ′, but also that it has a non-empty intersection with the set
of Nash equilibria of the static game Γ. The next two examples show that the two sets do not generally
include each other.
In Example 3.9 it holds that A(b0) 6⊆ A(s∗0).
Example 3.9. Consider the kite network presented in the introduction. Let I0 = {0, 1, 2, 3}, g01 =
g02 = g03 = g12 = g23 = 1, and g13 = 0 as shown in Figure 1. We can take any (fi)i∈I0 , (γi)i∈I0 , and d
satisfying the assumptions of Section 2. We claim that A(b0) 6⊆ A(s∗0) for a high enough δ. It is clear
that A(b0) includes the profile (0, 0, 1, 0) but, as it will be apparent, A(s
∗) does not.
By Proposition 3.8, x∗ = (0, 1, 0, 1) is absorbing in every SSPE. We argue that player 0 has a
strategy to ensure that x∗ is reached almost surely, irrespective of the initial effort profile x0, after
which neither the farsighted player nor the myopic opponents will be better off by moving away. The
strategy s′0 ∈ S0 is defined by setting, for x ∈ X,
s′0(x) =
{
0 if (x1, x2, x3) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1)},
1 otherwise.
A typical play of the game with the strategy profile (s′0, b1, b2, b3) proceeds as follows. If the game begins
in a generic effort profile, the farsighted player sets his own effort level to 1 as soon as he receives a
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revision opportunity. Afterwards, every time a myopic player receives a revision opportunity, his efforts
are set equal to 0, reaching the profile (1, 0, 0, 0). Once this is achieved, the farsighted player chooses
effort level 0. If player 2 receives the next revision opportunity, he chooses effort level 1, reaching
the profile (0, 0, 1, 0), where all myopic players are at best response, so only by player 0’s revision
will the game leave this profile, resetting the game to the effort profile (1, 0, 0, 0), and eventually to
(0, 0, 0, 0). If player 0 receives a revision opportunity at (0, 0, 0, 0), nothing happens. If either player
1 or player 3 receives the revision opportunity, then the game necessarily progresses to the absorbing
profile (0, 1, 0, 1).
Starting from initial effort profile x0 = (0, 0, 1, 0), strategy s′0 almost surely leads to effort profile
(0, 1, 0, 1), and, once this effort profile is reached, stays there and player 0 has a consumption equal to
2 in every period without making any effort. It follows that for a sufficiently high δ no SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗
can be such that s∗0(0, 0, 1, 0) = 0, since then consumption of the farsighted player would be equal to 1
in every period. We have that (0, 0, 1, 0) /∈ A(s∗0), whereas clearly (0, 0, 1, 0) ∈ A(b0).
In Example 3.10 it holds that A(s∗0) 6⊆ A(b0).
Example 3.10. Let I0 = {0, 1, 2}, for every i ∈ I0, γi = 1, and d = 2. We can take any (fi)i∈I0
satisfying the assumptions of Section 2. The network G is given by g01 = g12 = 1 and g02 = 0 and is
illustrated in Figure 4. Consider the effort profile x0 = (0, 0.5, 0.5) (see the left side of Figure 4). Since
b0(x
0) = 1/2, it is clear that x0 /∈ A(b0). We claim that x0 ∈ A(s∗) for a sufficiently high δ.
0
0
0.5
1
0.5
2
1
0
0
1
1
2
Figure 4: The network and initial effort profile of Example 3.10. Player 0 can choose between remaining under
his target consumption (left), or increasing his efforts and prompting a response (right). If player 0 increases his
effort, he faces a permanent decrease in efforts from player 1, who free rides on the effort exerted by player 2.
There is nothing player 0 can do to change that.
Clearly, for a strategy s0 ∈ S0 such that s0(x0) = 0, it holds that x0 ∈ A(s0), whereas x0 is not a
Nash equilibrium of the static game Γ. By playing 0 at x0, player 0 receives an indefinite payoff stream
equal to f0(0.5). Now consider s0 ∈ S0 with s0(x0) > 0. The only effort profiles x ∈ X that can be
reached from x0 are the ones where (x1, x2) = (1/2, 1/2) or (x1, x2) = (0, 1). Moreover, almost surely
an effort profile with (x1, x2) = (0, 1) is reached, since if players 1 and 2 receive revision opportunities
in this order, they will set their efforts to 0 and 1, respectively. From this point onwards, by the
assumptions on f0, every period’s instantaneous payoff that player 0 receives is at most f0(1) − 1.
Hence, if f0(1) − 1 < f0(0.5) and if δ is sufficiently high, it holds that s∗0(x0) = 0 for every SSPE
s∗ ∈ S∗.
Notice that the best effort profile for the farsighted player, x∗ = (0, 1, 0), cannot be reached when
x0 = (0, 0.5, 0.5).
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4 Dynamic properties of the game
In this section we discuss the dynamic development of effort levels of the myopic players. We show that
repeated updating by a group of myopic players results in reaching a partial Nash equilibrium. We go
on to demonstrate that as a result of the local substitution between the efforts of two myopic neighbors,
the game has a tendency towards rising inequality of exerted efforts. Players with high consumption
become free riders and players with low consumption end up making higher efforts. Finally, we show
that players with a distance of at least three from the farsighted player are not affected by him in the
long-run, meaning that any effect he might have on the game is either short-lived or localized. We
show a similar result for particular sets of contributing players with consumption equal to one, called
factions, that are outside the neighborhood of the farsighted player.
To show that repeated updating by a group of myopic players results in a partial Nash equilibrium,
we need the notion of a best-response potential game (Voorneveld, 2000).
Definition 4.1 (Best-response potential game). The static game Γ is a best-response potential game if
there exists a function φ : X → R such that, for every i ∈ I0, for every x ∈ X, it holds that
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i).
The function φ is called a best-response potential of Γ.
Proposition 4.2. The function φ defined by
φ(x) =
∑
i∈I0
(xi − 12
∑
j∈N i
xixj), x ∈ X,
is a best-response potential of Γ.
Proof. Let some i ∈ I0 and some x ∈ X be given. We first determine argmax xi∈R+ φ(xi, x−i). Taking
the derivative of φ with respect to xi yields
∂φ(xi, x−i)
∂xi
= 1− 12
∑
j∈N i
xj − 12
∑
j∈N i
xj = 1−
∑
j∈N i
xj .
It therefore holds that
argmax
xi∈R+
φ(xi, x−i) = max{0, 1−
∑
j∈N i
xj}.
Since x ∈ X, it follows that max{0, 1−∑j∈N i xj} is a non-negative multiple of 1/d, so belongs to Xi,
and therefore
argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i) = max{0, 1−
∑
j∈N i
xj}.
Since the right-hand size is equal to bi(x), we have shown that
argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(xi, x−i) = argmax
xi∈Xi
φ(xi, x−i).

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This result is analogous to ones in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), who show that φ is an exact potential
of a game with linear-quadratic payoffs, and in Bayer et al. (2019), who show that it is a best-response
potential of weighted network games where the strategies are on a continuum. Parise and O¨zdaglar
(2019) generalize this result by the use of variational inequalities for a wider class of games.
We can use Proposition 4.2 to show that repeated updating by a group of myopic players reaches
an effort profile where they all play best responses, thereby reaching a partial Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3 (Reaching a partial Nash equilibrium). Let s ∈ S0×{bI} and J ⊆ I. For every x ∈ X
there exists y ∈ RJs (x) such that, for every j ∈ J, yj = bj(y).
Proof. Let some x ∈ X be given and let all players in J update once in some given order, leading to
effort profile x1. For every j ∈ J, it holds that x1j ≤ 1. Any effort profile in RJs (x1) has effort levels
by players in J between 0 and 1, so RJs (x
1) is a finite set. Either, for every j ∈ J, x1j = bj(x) and we
are done, or there is j ∈ J such that x1j 6= bj(x1). In the latter case, an update by player j results in
x2 = βj(x
1). It holds that φ(x2) > φ(x1). Either, for every j ∈ J, x2j = bj(x) and we are done, or there
is j ∈ J such that x2j 6= bj(x2). Proceeding in this way, the fact that RJs (x1) is a finite set and the fact
that φ strictly increases in each iteration implies that we find y ∈ RJs (x) in a finite number of steps. 
Since only players in J are updating in the statement of Proposition 4.3, it follows that, for every
i ∈ I0 \J, yi = xi. Proposition 4.3 therefore means that updating by a group of myopic players leads to
a partial Nash equilibrium, irrespective of the effort levels of the players not belonging to the group. A
particular special case results when J = I. If the farsighted player’s efforts are held constant – whether
by his own choice or by the fact that he is not selected to become active for a time – the myopic players
will reach a partial Nash equilibrium of the game where the effort level of the farsighted player has
been fixed.
We show that these dynamics lead to a rise of inequality in the efforts exerted to create the local
public good.
Proposition 4.4 (Rising inequality). Let s ∈ S0×{bI}. Let x ∈ X, i ∈ I, and J ⊆ I∩Ni be given such
that for every j ∈ J it holds that cj(x) > ci(x). Then there exists y ∈ RJ∪{i}s (x) such that y(J) = 0
and yi ≥ xi.
Proof. First we show the statement for |J | = 1, so J = {j}. If xj = 0, the statement is true. If xj > 0
and x(Nj) ≥ 1, then the profile y = βj(x) satisfies all the desired properties.
We now consider the case where xj > 0 and x(Nj) < 1. Let players j and i revise once in sequence
and denote the resulting profile by x′. It holds that cj(x′) > ci(x′) as only the neighbors i and j updated.
Additionally, we have x′j = bj(x) = 1 − x(Nj) > 0 and x′i = bi(x′) = max{0, 1 − x(Ni) + xj − x′j}.
Substituting for x′j we get
x′i = max{0, x(Nj)− x(Ni) + xj} = max{0, cj(x)− ci(x) + xi} > xi.
We therefore must have cj(x
′) > ci(x′) = 1 as well.
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Consider a sequence of states ((x0, i1), (x1, i2), . . . , (x2d−1, i2d)) ∈ Ω2d such that x0 = x′, it = j if
t is odd and it = i if t is even, and for every t ≥ 1 we have xt = βit(xt−1). Since cj(x1) > 1 we have
x1j < x
0
j and ci(x
1) = 1− x0j + x1j , hence player i will increase his effort by the same amount as player
j’s decrease, i.e., x2i − x1i = x0j − x1j . Since cj(x2) > ci(x2) = 1 and x2i > x1i , the same argument can be
repeated. After at most 2d steps, player j will reach 0 and player i will have taken over all of player
j’s efforts and the resulting effort profile satisfies all the desired properties.
Now let J be a non-singleton set of myopic players. Fix j ∈ J . As shown above, a sequence of
alternating updates by players j and i allows the game to reach an action profile x′ ∈ X for which we
have x′j = 0 and x
′
i ≥ xi. We now show that for every j′ ∈ J \ {j} it holds that cj′(x′) > ci(x′). We
have
cj′(x
′) = x′(N j′ \ {i, j}) + x′i + gjj′x′j = cj′(x) + (x′i − xi) + gjj′(x′j − xj),
ci(x
′) = x′(N i \ {i, j}) + x′i + x′j = ci(x) + (x′i − xi) + (x′j − xj).
Since x′j − xj ≤ 0 and gjj′ ∈ {0, 1}, we have (gjj′ − 1)(x′j − xj) ≥ 0, hence we have cj′(x′) − ci(x′) ≥
cj′(x)− ci(x) > 0.
Therefore, we can proceed as in the singleton case until every player in J exerts an effort of 0 and
player i takes over the efforts of every j ∈ J . The resulting profile satisfies all the desired properties. 
We now introduce two notions to describe sets of contributing myopic players.
Definition 4.5 (Islands and factions). Let x ∈ X. A non-empty, connected set of myopic players
L ⊆ I is an island in x if for every j ∈ L it holds that xj > 0 and for every i ∈ NL \ {0} it holds that
xi = 0. An island F ⊆ I is a faction in x if for every j ∈ F it holds that cj(x) = 1. The collection of
islands in x is denoted by L(x) and the collection of factions by F(x).
An island is a set of contributing myopic players whose myopic neighbors outside the set are free riders.
A faction is an island where every player has a consumption level equal to 1 and is therefore at his best
response.
Consider a recurring effort profile and a faction in this effort profile outside the neighborhood of the
farsighted player. The next result states that every player in the faction and its neighborhood chooses
the same effort level in every effort profile that can be reached.
Proposition 4.6 (Members of factions outside N0 never change their efforts). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}, let
x ∈ X be recurring, and let y ∈ [x]s. For every F ∈ F(x) such that F ∩N0 = ∅, for every j ∈ NF , it
holds that bj(x) = xj = yj = bj(y).
Proof. Let F ∈ F(x) be such that F ∩N0 = ∅.
Assume that |F | = 1, i.e., F is a one-player faction, {j}. Since F is a faction, it holds that xj = 1
and, for every i ∈ Nj , xi = 0. It therefore holds that bj(x) = 1, whereas for every i ∈ Nj it holds that
bi(x) = 0. Any effort profile x
′ that results after an update from x therefore satisfies x′j = 1 and, for
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every i ∈ Nj , x′i = 0. Iterating this argument yields that bj(y) = yj = 1 = xj = bj(x) and, for every
i ∈ Nj , bi(y) = yi = 0 = xi = bi(x).
Now let m > 1 and assume that the statement holds for every faction with fewer than m members.
Assume |F | = m.
Suppose yj 6= xj for some j ∈ NF . Let i1, . . . , iT be a sequence of updating players in I0 and
x0, . . . , xT be a sequence of effort profiles in X such that, for every t = 1, . . . , T, x0 = x, xt = βit(x
t−1),
and xT = y. Let t be the lowest element of {1, . . . , T} for which there is i ∈ NF such that xti 6= xi.
Since for every i ∈ F it holds that xi = bi(x), it follows that it ∈ NF , so xtit > 0 = xit , and, for every
i ∈ NF \ {it}, xti = xi.
It holds that cit(x
t) = 1 as xit = bit(x
t) > 0. Furthermore, it must be true that F \ Nit 6= ∅,
otherwise xt(Nit) ≥ xt(F ) ≥ 1 and bit(xt) = 0, a contradiction. For every i ∈ F \ Nit it holds that
ci(x
t) = ci(x) = 1. Moreover, for every j ∈ Nit ∩ F we have cj(xt) = cj(x) + xtit > 1. Hence, by
Proposition 4.4 there exists y1 ∈ R(Nit∩F )∪{it}s (xt) such that y1(Nit ∩ F ) = 0. Notice that it is not in
the neighborhood of F \Nit , so |F \Nit | < m.
By Proposition 4.3 there exists y2 ∈ RF\Nits (y1) such that, for every i ∈ F \Nit , y2i = bi(y2). Since
F ∩N0 = ∅, there must be a player in F \Nit with positive effort at y2, so there is a faction F 2 ⊆ F \Nit
in y2. However, since y2 ∈ [x]s and since |F 2| ≤ |F \Nit | < m, we must have xi = y2i for every i ∈ NF 2 .
This contradicts the assumption that F ⊇ F 2 is a faction of m players in x. Consequently, for every
j ∈ NF , it holds that xj = yj .
Clearly, for every j ∈ NF , it holds that bj(x) = xj and bj(y) = yj , since otherwise player j would
change his effort level when given a revision opportunity. 
The intuition behind Proposition 4.6 is as follows. A one-player faction outside player 0’s neighborhood
will never change as it consists of a myopic player with an effort of 1 surrounded by free riders. None
of these players will change their effort levels before the other does so. Suppose the proposition is not
true for a two-player faction in a recurrent profile. It can then be shown that it is possible to reach a
one-player faction outside player 0’s neighborhood. But then the fact that a one-player faction never
changes leads to a contradiction with the original two-player faction being recurrent. By induction the
same argument can be extended to factions of more players.
The next proposition shows that any non-singleton recurring set contains a profile in which every
myopic player is at his best response and every faction is either completely inside or completely outside
the farsighted player’s neighborhood.
Proposition 4.7 (Factions are either completely inside or completely outside N0). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}
and let x ∈ X be a recurrent profile in s. If |[x]s| > 1, then there exists y ∈ [x]s ∩ X∗ such that for
every F ∈ F(y) it holds that either F ⊆ N0 or F ∩N0 = ∅.
Proof. See Appendix. 
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Example 3.10 shows that the statement of Proposition 4.7 cannot be extended to singleton recurring
sets.
Proposition 4.7 is used to show the next result.
Theorem 4.8 (Local impact only). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}, let x ∈ X be recurring, and let y ∈ [x]s. For
every i ∈ I such that N i ∩N0 = ∅ it holds that bi(x) = xi = yi = bi(y).
Proof. See Appendix. 
Theorem 4.8 states that for every network, all myopic players with a distance of at least three from the
farsighted player, i.e. those whose neighborhood does not intersect the neighborhood of the farsighted
player, will never change their efforts in a recurring set of effort profiles.
5 Bounds on payoffs and comparative statics
We now evaluate networks by comparing two numbers, the lowest and the highest long-run payoff the
farsighted player can guarantee for any initial state. We also consider the comparative statics of the
bounds as links are added to the network. We therefore make the network explicit in our notation for
the game. The collection of networks on the set of players I0 satisfying the assumptions of Section 2 is
denoted by G, so G = {G ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) : ∀i, j ∈ I0, gij = gji, gii = 1}. For G ∈ G, let K0(G) denote
the collection of independent sets of N0(G), the myopic players in the farsighted player’s neighborhood
in network G, and let e(G) denote the cardinality of a maximum independent set of N0(G), so
e(G) = max
K∈K0(G)
|K|.
The number e(G) is important for our purposes, since it corresponds to the maximum number of players
that the farsighted player can fully exploit simultaneously without any of the myopic players preferring
to deviate.
Definition 5.1 (Lower and upper bounds). The lower and upper bounds on the expected payoffs of
the farsighted player in the game Γ′(G) are given by
u(G) = infω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ limt→∞ ut0(ω, s∗).
u(G) = supω∈Ω,s∗∈S∗ limt→∞ ut0(ω, s∗).
We have related the SSPE strategy of the farsighted player to an optimal policy in an MDP, see the
proof of Proposition 2.5. Since the same player can be selected in a number of consecutive periods, the
MDP is aperiodic, which implies that the limits in Definition 5.1 are well-defined.
We first show that u(G) and u(G) coincide in networks where the farsighted player is linked to
every myopic opponent. Let G0 = {G ∈ G : ∀i ∈ I, g0i = 1} denote the set of such networks with n+ 1
players.
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Proposition 5.2. Let Γ′(G) be such that G ∈ G0. There exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ,
u(G) = u(G) = f0(e(G)).
Proof. See Appendix. 
We construct a strategy that guarantees a consumption of e(G) units of the good from without any own
efforts, for a long-run payoff of f0(e(G)). If the farsighted player is sufficiently patient, then his SSPE
strategy must also achieve at least this long-run payoff. This strategy is analogous to that of the kite
example presented in the introduction: (1) establish dependence by exerting an effort of 1 until every
myopic player decreases to 0, and (2) withdrawal of efforts and forcing an increase from the opponents.
Steps (1) and (2) are repeated if fewer than e(G) players increase after in the withdrawal stage. The
complexity of this strategy is rather low, thus the farsighted player does not need the sophistication to
compute the SSPE strategies to reach his optimal outcome. Note, however, that this strategy is not
necessarily an SSPE itself, as there may be better strategies that guarantee the same outcome, e.g. by
reaching the optimum sooner. We will generalize this point to the entire class of networks towards the
end of this section.
We now show how u(G) is directly related to e(G) for a general network G ∈ G for arbitrary values
of the discount factor.
Proposition 5.3. The upper bound on the farsighted player’s expected payoffs in the game Γ′(G)
satisfies
u(G) =
{
f0(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,
f0(1)− γ0 if e(G) = 0.
Proof. Let M ′ be a maximal independent set of I0 and M = M ′∩N0(G) be a maximum independent set
of N0(G), so e(G) = |M |. For every SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗ it holds that xM ′ ∈ A(s∗0) by Proposition 3.8. Within
the set X ′, the instantaneous payoffs of player 0 are maximized at xM ′ , meaning that u(G) = f0(e(G))
if N0 6= ∅, while u(G) = f0(1)− γ0 if N0 = ∅. 
Proposition 5.3 shows that the value of the upper bound is easily calculated as the cardinality of a
maximum independent set of the farsighted player’s neighborhood and can therefore be computed with
only local knowledge of the network.
To provide an expression for u(G), we need a few technical definitions first.
Definition 5.4 (Partnerships and closed partnerships). Let G ∈ G and x ∈ X. A, possibly empty,
union of factions in x is a partnership in x. The collection of partnerships in x is denoted by B(x) and the
largest partnership in x by B(x), so B(x) = ∪B∈B(x)B. A partnership B ∈ B(x) is closed if B ⊆ I\N0(G)
and for every i ∈ NB(G) it holds that x(N i(G) ∩ B) ≥ 1. The collection of closed partnerships in x is
denoted by B(x) and the largest closed partnership in x by B(x), so B(x) = ∪B∈B(x)B.
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Partnerships are unions of factions. It is easily verified that the union of two partnerships is a part-
nership, which implies that the largest partnership is indeed a partnership. A closed partnership is a
partnership whose members provide at least 1 unit of effort for each of their free-riding neighbors. It
is easily verified that the union of two closed partnerships is a closed partnership, which implies that
the largest closed partnership is indeed a closed partnership. For example, player 2 of the network on
the right side of Figure 2 is a closed partnership.
Definition 5.5 (Blocking profile). Let G ∈ G. The set Xb defined by
Xb = {x∗ ∈ X∗ | x∗0 = 1 and I \N0(G) ⊆ NB(x∗)(G)}
is the set of blocking profiles.
The set Xb consists of effort profiles such that the farsighted player has an effort level equal to one,
all myopic players have an effort level equal to their best response, implying that all players in the
neighborhood of the farsighted player have an effort level of 0 and all myopic players have a consumption
level greater than or equal to one, and all myopic players outside the neighborhood of the farsighted
player derive a consumption level of at least one from the contributions of their neighbors in the largest
closed partnership.
The set Xb is always non-empty, since whenever M is a maximal independent set of I \ N0(G),
then x{0}∪M ∈ Xb. The right side of Figure 2 shows a blocking profile. Further, X∗ \ Xb may be
non-empty. For the four-player line network in Figure 5, the given effort profile x∗ = (1, 0, 1/2, 1/2)
clearly belongs to X∗, but is not in Xb. It is indeed true that x∗0 = 1, but the partnership B = {2, 3}
is not a closed partnership, since x∗(N1(G) ∩ B) = x∗2 = 1/2 < 1. It holds that B(x∗) = ∅ and
I \N0(G) = {2, 3} 6⊆ ∅ = NB(x∗)(G).
1
0
0
1
0.5
2
0.5
3
Figure 5: Example showing a static equilibrium profile that is not a blocking profile.
At an effort profile in Xb, no player in I \N0(G) reacts to changes in efforts by player 0 as all belong
to or are neighbors of a closed partnership. Such a player is “blocked.” Some players in N0(G) may
also receive contributions greater than or equal to one from their neighbors in the closed partnership.
Such players will also not respond to changes in efforts by player 0 and are blocked as well.
For x ∈ Xb, let Iu0 (x) = I0 \NB(x)(G) denote the players who are “unblocked,” i.e. not blocked by
the largest closed partnership. Note that Iu0 (x) ⊆ N0(G) as all other players are blocked by a closed
partnership by Definition 5.5, but in general Iu0 (x) is not equal to N0(G).
For every G ∈ G, we define e(G) by
e(G) = min
x∈Xb
e(G |Iu0 (x)),
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where for a given network G and a given subset of the players J ⊆ I0, G |J denotes the network resulting
from removing all players in I0 \ J and the links related to these players from the network G.
The value e(G) equals the minimum number of players that the farsighted player can exploit no
matter what the initial state is. The reason for this is the following. Since in a blocking effort profile
x ∈ Xb all players outside of Iu0 (x) are getting more than one unit of effort from some members of
a closed partnership, we consider the subgraph of G where these players are removed. From such a
subgraph we take the cardinality of the maximum independent set e(G |Iu0 (x)), since, as seen previously
in Proposition 5.3, getting one unit of effort from the maximum independent set of his neighborhood is
the best instantaneous payoff the farsighted player can hope for. In addition, this payoff is attainable,
as we will show in the next proposition. By taking the minimum over effort profiles in Xb, the value
e(G) gives the exact number of units of the public good that is attainable for even the worst choice of
the starting state.
Proposition 5.6. There exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ, the lower bound on the farsighted
player’s expected payoffs in the game Γ′(G) is given by
u(G) =
{
f0(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,
f0(1)− γ0 if e(G) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix. 
By Proposition 5.6, the value of the lower bound hinges on the maximum number of independent
neighbors of 0 that cannot be blocked. Every such player is liable to exploitation by the farsighted
player via the dependence-withdrawal strategy.
Similarly to Proposition 5.2, there are relatively simple strategies to guarantee the long-run payoff
of the lower bound. The farsighted player first makes sure that a blocking effort profile is reached.
This involves exerting an effort of 1 as long as there are players in N0(G) with positive efforts and
contributing 0 if all players in N0(G) are free riding. It can be shown that such a strategy leads to a
blocking profile with probability one. Next the farsighted player exploits a maximum independent set
of unblocked players.
The characterizations of the bounds leads us to our main comparative statics results. For a network
G with gij = 0, let Gij be the network we get by adding the link {i, j} to G.
Theorem 5.7. Let G ∈ G and i, j ∈ I0 be such that gij = 0.
1. (Sociability) If 0 ∈ {i, j}, then u(G) ≤ u(Gij) and u(G) ≤ u(Gij). In addition, if Ni(G)∩Nj(G) =
∅ we have u(G) < u(Gij).
2. (Jealousy) If i, j ∈ N0(G), then u(G) ≥ u(Gij) and u(G) ≥ u(Gij).
3. Otherwise, u(G) = u(Gij).
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Proof. By Propositions 5.3 and 5.6, and by the strict monotonicity of f0, it is sufficient to show the
analogue of Theorem 5.7 after replacing u with e and u with e in all three statements. The substitution
also makes use of f0(1) > f0(1)−γ0 for the cases e(G) = 0 and e(G) = 0. Let Xbij be the set of blocking
profiles for the network Gij .
1. Without loss of generality, let i = 0. Let K ′ ∈ K0(G). Since gij = 0, it holds that j /∈ K ′. After
adding the link between i and j, the set K ′ is therefore still independent, so K ′ ∈ K0(Gij). It follows
that
e(G) = max
K∈K0(G)
|K| ≤ max
K∈K0(Gij)
|K| = e(Gij).
In case N0(G) ∩ Nj(G) = ∅, it holds that K ′ ∪ {j} ∈ K0(Gij), so the weak inequality above becomes
strict and e(G) < e(Gij).
Let x ∈ Xbij and let B be the related largest closed partnership in Gij . Since j ∈ N0(Gij), it
holds that j /∈ B. If j /∈ NB(Gij), then define x∗ ∈ X by x∗j = 1 and x∗−j = x−j . It holds that
x∗ ∈ Xb and B(x∗) = B ∪{j}. Player j was unblocked in Gij and is part of B(x∗) in G. It follows that
e(G |I0\NB∪{j}(G)) ≤ e(Gij |I0\NB(Gij)). If j ∈ NB(Gij), then since B is a closed partnership in Gij , a
contribution of 0 is a best-response for player j against x in the network G, so x ∈ Xb and B(x) = B.
We have that e(G |I0\NB(G)) = e(Gij |I0\NB(Gij)). We conclude that e(G) ≤ e(Gij).
2. Let i, j ∈ N0(G). Let K ′ ∈ K0(Gij). After deleting the link between i and j, the set K ′ is still
independent, so K ′ ∈ K0(G). It follows that
e(Gij) = max
K∈K0(Gij)
|K| ≤ max
K∈K0(G)
|K| = e(G).
We first observe that Xb = Xbij . Let J be any subset of N0(G). Since any independent set of Gij |J is
also an independent set of G |J , it follows that e(G) ≥ e(Gij).
3. In this case G |N0(G)= Gij |N0(Gij), which leads to the desired conclusion. 
A new link is either beneficial or neutral to the farsighted player if it adds a myopic player to his
neighborhood. This result is called Sociability, as the farsighted player always weakly benefits from
forming new links. A new link is harmful or neutral to the farsighted player if two of his unlinked
neighbors become linked. This result is called Jealousy, as the farsighted player is always weakly
harmed by his neighbors linking up with each other. Adding any other links has no effect on the upper
bound, while their effect on the lower bound is ambiguous. This fact will be demonstrated in Examples
5.8 and 5.9.
The comparison results concerning the upper bound are achieved as straightforward consequences
of its characterization as the cardinality of a maximum independent set of the farsighted player’s
neighborhood. Adding a player into the neighborhood increases the number of players whose efforts
are enjoyed by the farsighted player, although depending on the connections the upper bound may not
change. In case the new neighbor shares no connection with any of the old ones, the upper bound is
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guaranteed to increase, implying that the farsighted player would prefer linking to more distant players
in the network rather than to neighbors of his neighbors.
Changes in the network affecting the neighborhood of the farsighted player have the same effect
on the lower bound. A new link between two neighbors of the farsighted player has no effect on the
set of blocking profiles but it can decrease the cardinality of the maximum independent sets of the
remaining players, lowering the lower bound. Adding a new neighbor reduces set of blocking profiles
while potentially increasing the cardinality of maximum independent sets, both effects work to increase
the lower bound. In all other cases the new link changes the set of blocking profiles in a way that can
lead to an increase or to a decrease in the lower bound. This is demonstrated by the following two
examples which make up the remainder of this section.
Example 5.8. Consider a network of five players {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} with the following four links: {0, 1},
{1, 2}, {0, 3} and {3, 4}. In this network, the value of the lower bound is f0(1)−γ0, since both neighbors
of the farsighted player can be blocked. The left side of Figure 6 shows the network and an appropriate
blocking profile.
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Figure 6: The network and worst blocking effort profile of Example 5.8 initially (left), adding the link {2, 4}
(middle), and adding the link {1, 4} (right). After linking the two non-neighbors of player 0, his two neighbors
cannot be blocked at the same time. However, adding another link they can be blocked again.
Adding the link {2, 4} eliminates this blocking effort profile as players 2 and 4 both exerting an
effort of 1 is no longer stable for myopic deviation. Hence, at least one of players 1 and 3 will always be
free to provide for player 0, and the value of the lower bound increases to f0(1). The resulting network
with a new blocking profile is shown in the middle of Figure 6. Now consider adding the link {1, 4} to
the new network. Then, the profile in which player 4 has an effort of 1 and all other myopic players are
free riding once again blocks both neighbors of the farsighted player. This resulting network is shown
on the right side of the figure.
This illustrates that adding a link between two non-neighbors can benefit the farsighted player,
while adding a link between a neighbor and a non-neighbor may harm him.
Example 5.8 shows two simple cases through which the lower bound can be influenced. Linking the
farsighted player’s neighbors to non-neighbors can make it easier to achieve blocking effort profiles due
to more links, while linking two non-neighbors to each other can make it harder, as closed partnerships
will be harder to find.
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While the above reasoning holds for many networks, there are examples where linking a neighbor
to a non-neighbor, or deleting a link between two non-neighbors both have the potential to increase the
lower bound if the original blocking profile is sensitive to any changes in the network. This is shown in
the following example.
Example 5.9. Consider a network with 17 players. The farsighted player is linked to ten myopic
players, none of which have links between them. The remaining six myopic players are grouped into
two cliques of three players, but there are no links between the cliques. One of the farsighted player’s
neighbors has no other neighbors. The other nine neighbors are connected to three other players each:
one player from one clique and two players from the other. No two of these nine players have the same
set of neighbors.
In this network, the profile where the six clique members are each exerting an effort of 1/3 each
blocks the nine neighbors, and this is the only blocking profile that will block all of them, while the
tenth neighbor cannot be blocked in any way, hence the value of the lower bound is f0(1). Figure 7
shows this network and blocking profile.
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Figure 7: The network and the worst blocking profile of Example 5.9. The dotted ellipsis and lines indicate the
neighborhood of the farsighted player.
Suppose that we remove a link in the cliques with which each of the nine neighbors has one link
so that this clique now forms a line of three players. As a result, the blocking profile in Figure 7 is
no longer admissible, since they are no longer in a partnership. The new worst blocking profile is the
one in which the center player of the line is a free rider and the other two players have an effort of 1,
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while the other clique has two free riders and one player with 1 effort. The value of the lower bound
increases to f0(2). The new blocking profile is shown on the left side of Figure 8.
Finally, suppose that we take the original network and add a link between the tenth neighbor and
one of the members of the clique with which the nine neighbors have one link. Then, the original
blocking profile of Figure 7 will again be inadmissible as it provides an effort of only 1/3 to the tenth
neighbor, thus it is not a blocking profile. The worst blocking profile is the one where each clique has a
single player with 1 effort, including the one to whom the tenth neighbor is now linked. In this profile
the farsighted player is no longer able to exploit the tenth player, but instead gains from two of his
nine other neighbors, who are now linked to trios of free riders. The value of the lower bound again
increases to f0(2). This profile is shown on the right side of Figure 6.
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Figure 8: The network and a worst effort profile of Example 5.9 with one link from one of the cliques removed
(left) and one link added (right). The number of neighbors that can be exploited increases to 2 in both cases.
As a consequence of Theorem 5.7, for a fixed number of players, the star network with the farsighted
player in the center maximizes both the lower and the upper bound, and they are equal to f0(n − 1)
by Proposition 5.2. If linking to new players is a costless option, then the first statement of Theorem
5.7 guarantees that the farsighted player will link to all myopic players. Additionally, if the farsighted
player can sever links running between myopic players, then the second statement implies that the star
network will be reached by severing all links between his neighbors. However, as shown by Example
5.8, deleting a link between two myopic players who are not both neighbors of the farsighted player may
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decrease the lower bound. Furthermore, Example 5.9 shows that adding a link between two myopic
players can increase the value of the lower bound. These two facts provide stumbling blocks for a
farsighted player from reaching the star network.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we consider the private provision of local public goods game, a gameclass with a wide array
of applicability and a strong body of theoretical contributions. We build a model of manipulation and
exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player with the goal of analyzing exploitative
behavior in various social networks.
We consider a dynamic and stochastic setting such that in every time period a randomly selected
player is given a chance to revise his exerted effort into the local public good. With this dynamic,
a game played by a myopic population is known to converge to a Nash effort profile. The farsighted
player’s optimal strategies correspond to optimal policies of an MDP, and hence, stationary subgame
perfect equilibria of this game exist for every network structure and discount factor of the farsighted
player. We find that every network and every SSPE permits the existence of absorbing effort profiles
that are stable for deviations given the strategies of the players and that the set of absorbing profiles
is neither a subset nor a superset of the set of Nash equilibria of the static game.
Unless stable partnerships of myopic players are able to form, players with lower consumption will
increase their efforts, while players with high consumption will lower theirs. As these two effects are
mutually reinforcing one another, we observe a tendency towards a rising inequality of production of
the local public good within the myopic population. Consequently, partnerships may form with clusters
of producers being surrounded by free riders.
In the long run, every member of a partnership of myopic players outside the farsighted player’s
neighborhood will produce a constant effort level, as the free riders surrounding the partnerships will
dampen the effects of any future changes in efforts by the farsighted player. This means that players
who do not share a neighbor with the farsighted player will also produce constant effort levels in the
long run. As a result, the impact of the farsighted player on the myopic population are both short-lived
and localized within the network.
Finally, we compare networks based on the opportunities of exploitation they provide to the far-
sighted player. To make the comparison, we analyze the farsighted player’s minimum and maximum
available long-run payoff they can attain in a network by playing optimally. We provide characteri-
zations for both bounds by the use of maximum independent sets of (some subset of) the farsighted
player’s neighborhood, and show that the value of the lower bound is reachable from any starting state
by a very simple dependence-withdrawal strategy. If the farsighted player is linked to every myopic
opponent, the upper bound is also reachable with this strategy. The farsighted player is Sociable, as
both bounds increase from the addition of a new link between him and a myopic player, and Jealous,
as both bounds decrease from the addition of a new link between two of his neighbors. From this
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we conclude that the star network maximizes the farsighted player’s prospects for exploitation, but
there are cases when adding a link between two myopic players increases his minimum and maximum
evaluation.
This paper’s results has interesting implications on the case of multiple farsighted players as well.
Equilibrium existence in this case no longer follows from the theory of MDPs. On the other hand,
since the farsighted player’s impact on the myopic population is localized, we conjecture that multiple
farsighted players with sufficient distance from each other will not interact with one another in the long
run, and most dynamic results of this paper are upheld. Our results therefore can be generalized to
multiple farsighted players provided that they appear sparsely in the network. An explicit analysis of
this case is left for future research.
A Appendix: Proofs
Before proving Proposition 4.7, we introduce a number of technical concepts and results. For x ∈ X,
j ∈ I, and J ⊆ I we use the notation N+j (x) = Nj ∩ I+(x) and N+J (x) = NJ ∩ I+(x) for the neighbors
of j, respectively J, with positive contributions. Next, we introduce the notion of a buffer set, which
corresponds to all the neighbors whose contributions a given player can usurp by making repeated use
of Proposition 4.4.
Definition A.1 (Buffer set). Let x0 ∈ X and j ∈ I be given such that x0j > 0. Define
D0j (x
0) = {i ∈ N+j (x0) : ci(x0) > cj(x0)}.
For k ≥ 1, define xk ∈ X and Dkj (x0) ⊆ Nj recursively by:
xki =

0 if i ∈ Dk−1j (x0),
max{0, 1− xk−1(Nj \Dk−1j (x0))} if i = j,
xk−1i otherwise.
Dkj (x
0) = Dk−1j (x
0) ∪ {i ∈ N+j (xk) : ci(xk) > cj(xk)} = Dk−1j (x0) ∪D0j (xk).
The set Dj(x
0) = ∪k∈NDkj (x0) is the buffer set of player j in effort profile x0.
Since the set Nj is finite, there is k
′ ∈ N such that Dk′j (x0) = Dk
′−1
j (x0), so D
k′
j (x
0) = Dj(x
0). The
buffer set Dj(x
0) consists of all the players whose efforts can be usurped by player j starting from effort
profile x0 according to a repeated use of Proposition 4.4.
For k ≥ 0, the effort profile xk+1 with xk+1j > 0 results after the efforts of the players in Dkj (x0)
have been usurped. Proposition 4.4 guarantees that xk+1j ≥ xkj > 0. Additionally, for every i ∈ Dj(x0)
we have ci(x
k′) ≥ cj(xk′). By Proposition 4.4, for every s ∈ S0×{bI}, we have xk+1 ∈ RD
k
j (x
0)∪{j}
s (x0).
It follows that xk
′ ∈ RDj(x0)∪{j}s (x0).
Definition A.2 (Valley). A non-empty set V ⊆ I+(x) is a valley at x ∈ X if V is connected, for every
j, j′ ∈ V, cj(x) = cj′(x), and for every i ∈ N+V (x), ci(x) > cj(x).
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Every valley is a subset of an island, since all players in a valley are connected and have positive
effort levels. Also, every island contains at least one valley. Every faction is a valley, since all players
in a faction have consumption equal to 1 and there are no players with positive effort levels in the
neighborhood of a faction.
Lemma A.3. Let x0 ∈ X and a valley V ⊆ I+(x0) be given. For every k ≥ 0, for every j ∈ V, and
for every i ∈ N+j (x0) \Dkj (x0) it holds that
i ∈ Dk+1j (x0) \Dkj (x0) ⇐⇒ Dkj (x0) 6⊆ Ni. (2)
Proof. We start by proving the equivalence in (2) for k = 0. Let some j ∈ V and some i ∈ N+j (x0) \
D0j (x
0) be given. Observe that ci(x
0) = cj(x
0) since V is a valley and i /∈ D0j (x0).
(⇒) From i ∈ D1j (x0), it follows that ci(x1) > cj(x1). By Definition A.1, we have that
cj(x
1)− cj(x0) = x1j − x0j − x0(D0j (x0)).
Suppose D0j (x
0) ⊆ Ni. By i ∈ Nj , we have
ci(x
1)− ci(x0) = x1j − x0j − x0(D0j (x0)),
so ci(x
0) = cj(x
0) implies ci(x
1) = cj(x
1), a contradiction to ci(x
1) > cj(x
1). Consequently, it holds
that D0j (x
0) 6⊆ Ni.
(⇐) From D0j (x0) 6⊆ Ni it follows that
ci(x
1)− ci(x0) = x1j − x0j − x0(D0j (x0) ∩Ni) > x1j − x0j − x0(D0j (x0)),
so ci(x
0) = cj(x
0) implies ci(x
1) > cj(x
1), hence i ∈ D1j (x0).
Assume, for some k ≥ 1, for every j ∈ V, and, for every i ∈ N+j (x0) \Dk−1j (x0), we have ci(xk−1) =
cj(x
k−1) as well as the equivalence i ∈ Dkj (x0) \ Dk−1j (x0) ⇔ Dk−1j (x0) 6⊆ Ni. We now show that the
same assertion holds for k + 1.
Let some j ∈ V and some i ∈ N+j (x0) \Dkj (x0) be given. By Definition A.1, we have that
cj(x
k)− cj(xk−1) = xkj − xk−1j − xk−1(Dk−1j (x0)).
Since i /∈ Dkj (x0), it holds that Dk−1j (x0) ⊆ Ni, so
ci(x
k)− ci(xk−1) = xkj − xk−1j − xk−1(Dk−1j (x0)),
so ci(x
k−1) = cj(xk−1) implies ci(xk) = cj(xk).
(⇒) From i ∈ Dk+1j (x0), it follows that ci(xk+1) > cj(xk+1). By Definition A.1, we have that
cj(x
k+1)− cj(xk) = xk+1j − xkj − xk(Dkj (x0)).
Suppose Dkj (x
0) ⊆ Ni. By i ∈ Nj , we have
ci(x
k+1)− ci(xk) = xk+1j − xkj − xk(Dkj (x0)),
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so ci(x
k) = cj(x
k) implies ci(x
k+1) = cj(x
k+1), a contradiction to ci(x
k+1) > cj(x
k+1). Consequently,
it holds that Dkj (x
0) 6⊆ Ni.
(⇐) From Dkj (x0) 6⊆ Ni it follows that
ci(x
k+1)− ci(xk) = xk+1j − xkj − xk(Dkj (x0) ∩Ni) > xk+1j − xkj − xk(Dkj (x0)),
so ci(x
k) = cj(x
k) implies ci(x
k+1) > cj(x
k+1), hence i ∈ Dk+1j (x0). 
Lemma A.4. Let x ∈ X and a valley V ⊆ I+(x) be given. Let i, j ∈ V be such that gij = 1.
1. If j /∈ Di(x) and i /∈ Dj(x), then Di(x) = Dj(x).
2. If j /∈ Di(x) and i ∈ Dj(x), then Di(x) ⊂ Dj(x).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that i /∈ Dj(x) implies Dj(x) ⊆ Di(x). Let i /∈ Dj(x), so by Lemma A.3,
for every k ≥ 0, Dkj (x) ⊆ Ni. We show that for every k ≥ 0, Dkj (x) ⊆ Dki (x).
For every i′ ∈ D0j (x) we have ci(x) = cj(x) < ci′(x), so since D0j (x) ⊆ Ni, we have i′ ∈ D0i (x), so
D0j (x) ⊆ D0i (x).
We complete the proof by showing that, for every k ≥ 0, Dkj (x) ⊆ Dki (x) implies Dk+1j (x) ⊆
Dk+1i (x). Suppose D
k
j (x) ⊆ Dki (x) but Dk+1j (x) 6⊆ Dk+1i (x). Then there exists i′ ∈ Dk+1j (x) such
that i′ /∈ Dk+1i (x). It follows that i′ /∈ Dki (x), so i′ /∈ Dkj (x). We have i′ /∈ D0j (x), hence it holds
ci′(x) = cj(x). It follows that i
′ ∈ V. Since Dk+1j (x) ⊆ Ni, we have i′ ∈ Ni. By Lemma A.3, i′ ∈ Dk+1j (x)
implies Dkj (x) 6⊆ Ni′ , while i′ /∈ Dk+1i (x) implies Dki (x) ⊆ Ni′ , contradicting Dkj (x) ⊆ Dki (x). 
The next lemma provides conditions on x ∈ X such that for every player j′ in a given valley at x
there exists a connected subset of the valley such that every player in the subset can usurp all the
contributing neighbors of the subset as well as Dj′(x) thereby creating a buffer around the subset.
Lemma A.5. Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}. Let x ∈ X be a recurrent effort profile and let V ⊆ I+(x) \ N0 be
a valley at x. For every j′ ∈ V there exists ∅ 6= L ⊆ V, D = N+L (x), and y ∈ RL∪Ds (x) such that
Dj′(x) ⊆ D and:
1. For every j ∈ L, Dj(x) = D.
2. L is an island at y.
Proof. Let some j′ ∈ V be given. The following algorithm ends with a connected L ⊆ V such that for
every j ∈ L, Dj(x) = N+L (x) ⊇ Dj′(x):
Step 0. Define k = 0, Lk = {j′}, and Dk = Dj′(x).
Increase k by 1 and go to Step 1.
Step 1. If Dk = N+
Lk
(x), then terminate. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2. Take ik ∈ N+
Lk
(x) \Dk and jk ∈ Lk ∩Nik .
If jk /∈ Dik(x), then define Lk+1 = Lk ∪ {ik} and Dk+1 = Dk.
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If jk ∈ Dik(x), then define Lk+1 = {ik} and Dk+1 = Dik(x).
Increase k by 1 and go to Step 1.
It holds that L0 = {j′}, so L0 ⊆ V and, for every j ∈ L0, Dj(x) = D0. Assume, for some k ≥ 0,
Lk ⊆ V and, for every j ∈ Lk, Dj(x) = Dk. We show that Lk+1 ⊆ V and, for every j ∈ Lk+1,
Dj(x) = D
k+1. Since ik ∈ N+
Lk
(x)\Djk(x), it holds by Definition A.1 and the definition of a valley that
cik(x) = cjk(x), so i
k ∈ V. It follows that Lk+1 ⊆ V. If jk /∈ Dik(x), then the first part of Lemma A.4
implies Dik(x) = Djk(x), so together with the assumption that, for every j ∈ Lk, Dj(x) = Dk, we find
that for every j ∈ Lk+1, Dj(x) = Dk = Dk+1. If jk ∈ Dik(x), then Lk+1 = {ik} and Dk+1 = Dik(x), so
obviously, for every j ∈ Lk+1, Dj(x) = Dk+1.
We show next that the algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps. If jk ∈ Dik(x), then it
follows by the second part of Lemma A.4 that Djk(x) ⊂ Dik(x), so Dk ⊂ Dk+1. If jk /∈ Dik(x), then
Dk = Dk+1 and Lk ⊂ Lk+1. The set Dk is therefore monotonically increasing. In iterations where it
is constant, the set Lk is strictly increasing. Since there are only finitely many agents, the algorithm
must terminate in Step 1 after a finite number of steps, say `. We define L = L` and D = D`. It follows
easily that L is connected and, for every j ∈ L, Dj(x) = N+L (x) ⊇ Dj′(x).
Take a player j ∈ L and define y = xk′ ∈ R{j}∪Ds (x0), where xk′ with xk′j > 0 is the effort profile
that results after player j usurps the players in D, see below Definition A.1. For every i ∈ D, yi = 0.
Since D = N+L (x) and y(D) = 0, L is an island in y. 
Proposition 4.7 (Factions are either completely inside or completely outside N0). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}
and let x ∈ X be a recurrent profile in s. If |[x]s| > 1, then there exists y ∈ [x]s ∩ X∗ such that for
every F ∈ F(y) it holds that either F ⊆ N0 or F ∩N0 = ∅.
Proof. By Proposition 4.3 there exists x1 ∈ RIs(x) such that x10 = x0 and x1 ∈ X∗. If no faction in x1
has members in both N0 and I \N0, then we are done, so consider the case where there exists a faction
F ∈ F(x1) such that F ∩N0 6= ∅ and F \N0 6= ∅.
Since |[x]s| > 1, we must have that either s0(x1) > x10 or s0(x1) < x10. Suppose s0(x1) > x10. Let x2
be the effort profile that results from x1 after a revision by player 0. For every i ∈ F ∩ N0, for every
j ∈ F \N0, we have ci(x2i ) > cj(x2j ) = 1. Let V be a component of F \N0. It is easily verified that V
is a valley. By Lemma A.5 there exists an effort profile y2 ∈ RIs(x2) and an island L ⊆ V in y2. By
Proposition 4.3 there exists y3 ∈ RLs (y2) such that, for every j ∈ L, y3j = bj(y3). Since L ∩ N0 = ∅,
at least one of the players in L makes a positive contribution at y3, so there is a faction F 3 ⊆ L in
y3. Proposition 4.6 implies that, for every i ∈ NF 3 , y3i = x1i , so F 3 is a faction in x1, leading to a
contradiction since F 3 is a proper subset of F. Consequently, we have that s0(x
1) < x10.
By Proposition 4.3 there exists x2 ∈ RIs(x1) such that x20 = s0(x1) and x2 ∈ X∗. If no faction in
x2 has members in both N0 and I \ N0, we are done. Otherwise, there exists F 2 ∈ F(x2) such that
F 2 ∩N0 6= ∅ and F 2 \N0 6= ∅. By the same argument as in the previous paragraph it must hold that
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s0(x
2) < x20. Since player 0 cannot decrease his efforts forever, we can repeat this argument until we
find an effort profile with the desired properties. 
Theorem 4.8 (Local impact only). Let s ∈ S0 × {bI}, let x ∈ X be recurring, and let y ∈ [x]s. For
every i ∈ I such that N i ∩N0 = ∅ it holds that bi(x) = xi = yi = bi(y).
Proof. In case |[x]s| = 1, the statement holds trivially, so assume |[x]s| > 1. By Proposition 4.7 there
exists x1 ∈ [x]s ∩ X∗ such that every faction in x1 is either completely inside or completely outside
N0. By Proposition 4.6, for every F ∈ F(x1) such that F ∩ N0 = ∅, for every i ∈ NF , it holds that
bi(x) = xi = yi = bi(y).
Suppose the theorem is false. Then there is a player j ∈ I such that N j ∩N0 = ∅ and x1j = 0 and
there is x2 ∈ [x]s such that x2j > 0. It follows that there must exist an effort profile x3 ∈ [x]s such
that x3j = 0 and x
3(Nj) < 1, since otherwise the profile x
2 with x2j > 0 cannot be reached from x
1. By
Proposition 4.3 there exists x4 ∈ RI\Njs (x3) such that, for every i ∈ I \N j , x4i = bi(x4). We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: mini∈N+j (x4) ci(x
4) > cj(x
4) = x4(Nj). By applying Proposition 4.4 for J = N
+
j (x
4), we
reach an effort profile x5 for which x5(N+j (x
4)) = x5(Nj) = 0. The profile x
6 = βj(x
5) belongs to [x]s
and has {j} as a one-player faction, where {j}∩N0 = ∅. By Proposition 4.6 it follows that x1j = x6j = 1,
a contradiction with x1j = 0.
Case 2: mini∈N+j (x4) ci(x
4) ≤ cj(x4) = x4(Nj). For every i ∈ N+Nj (x
4) it holds that x4i = bi(x
4), so
ci(x
4) = 1. Since x4(Nj) = x
3(Nj) < 1, there is a valley V in x
4 with V ⊆ N j . From N j ∩N0 = ∅, it
follows that V ∩N0 = ∅. By Lemma A.5 there exists L ⊆ V and there exists x5 ∈ RIs(x4) such that L
is an island at x5. By Proposition 4.3 there exists x6 ∈ RLs (x5) such that, for every i ∈ L, x6i = bi(x6).
Since L ∩ N0 = ∅, at least one of the players in L makes a positive contribution at x6, so there is a
faction F 6 ⊆ L in x6. Since F 6 ∩N0 = ∅, it follows by Proposition 4.6 that for every i ∈ F 6, ci(x4) = 1.
At the same time, i ∈ V, so ci(x4) ≤ cj(x4) < 1. 
Proposition 5.2. Let Γ′(G) be such that G ∈ G0. There exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ,
u(G) = u(G) = f0(e(G)).
Proof. For x ∈ X, let I1(x) = {i ∈ I : xi = 1} denote the set of myopic players with effort level 1. Let
M ∈ K0(G) be an independent set of N0(G) with cardinality e(G) and consider the strategy s0 ∈ S0
defined by
s0(x) =
{
0 if I1(x) ⊆M,
1 otherwise.
To show the statement, we first argue that under the strategy profile s = (s0, bI) the game reaches
an effort profile where the farsighted player’s instantaneous payoff equals f0(e(G)) with probability
1. Let xM ∈ X be the effort profile for which xi = 1 if i ∈ M and xi = 0 otherwise. Notice that
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A(s0) = {xM} as in every other effort profile the farsighted player or a member of M would change
his effort. Furthermore, for every x ∈ X it holds that xM ∈ Rs(x). In fact, the following sequence of
updates shows that it is reachable by fewer than n+2+e(G) revisions. Assume I1(x) 6⊆M. An update
by player 0 results in effort level s0(x) = 1. Next revisions by each of the myopic players in any given
order result in them choosing an effort level equal to 0. This takes n steps and results in an effort
profile x′. Next, player 0 decreases his efforts to s0(x′) = 0. Finally, the members of M revise in any
order to reach the profile xM in e(G) more steps. Assume I1(x) ⊆M. Then the members of M \ I1(x)
revise in any order and reach the profile xM in at most e(G) steps. The effort profile xM is absorbing
for s0. It follows that, for every ω ∈ Ω,
lim
t→∞u
t
0(ω, s) = f0(e(G)).
Since there exists a strategy that guarantees a long-run payoff of f0(e(G)) there is δ < 1 such that, for
every δ > δ, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗,
lim
t→∞u
t
0(ω, s
∗) ≥ lim
t→∞u
t
0(ω, s) = f0(e(G)).
On the other hand, f0(e(G)) = maxx∈X′ pi0(x), so by Proposition 3.5 and Remark 3.6 we also have, for
every ω ∈ Ω, for every SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗,
lim
t→∞u
t
0(ω, s
∗) ≤ f0(e(G)).
We conclude that there exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ, u(G) = u(G) = f0(e(G)). 
Proposition 5.6. There exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ, the lower bound on the farsighted
player’s expected payoffs in the game Γ′(G) is given by
u(G) =
{
f0(e(G)) if e(G) > 0,
f0(1)− γ0 if e(G) = 0.
Proof. We first consider the case where e(G) = 0. In any network the farsighted player can guarantee
the long-run payoff f0(1) − γ0 by making an effort of s0(x) = 1 for every x ∈ X. Hence, there exists
δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ, we have u(G) ≥ f0(1)− γ0. Let xb ∈ Xb be such that e(G |Iu0 (xb)) = 0,
which happens if and only if N0(G) ∩ Iu0 (xb) = ∅. When the action profile is equal to xb, player 0 acts
as if he was the only player as he gets a contribution of 0 from his neighbors and no player will change
his effort level no matter what player 0 does. Hence, in every SSPE s∗ ∈ S∗ we must have s∗0(xb) = 1,
meaning that u(G) ≤ f0(1)− γ0 also holds.
Now consider the case e(G) > 0. We show first that u(G) ≤ f0(e(G)). Let xb ∈ Xb be such that
e(G) = e(G |Iu0 (xb)). At effort profile xb, in every SSPE the players outside Iu0 (xb) never change their
efforts and no player in Iu0 (x
b) is connected to a player with positive efforts outside Iu0 (x
b). Therefore,
the players inside Iu0 (x
b) do not affect the players outside Iu0 (x
b) in any way. We can therefore remove
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the players outside Iu0 (x
b) from the network and study the network G |Iu0 (xb). Since Iu0 (xb) ⊆ N0(G),
we can apply Proposition 5.2. Hence, there exists δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ,
u(G |Iu0 (xb)) = f0(e(G |Iu0 (xb))).
We find that
u(G) ≤ u(G |Iu0 (xb)) = f0(e(G)).
We show next that there exists a strategy for the farsighted player which achieves long-run payoffs
greater than or equal to u(G), irrespective of the initial state. From this it follows that there exists
δ < 1 such that, for every δ > δ, u(G) ≥ f0(e(G)), which completes the proof.
For n = 1, the strategy s0 ∈ S0 such that s0(x) = 0 for every x ∈ X achieves long-run payoffs
greater than or equal to u(G) = f0(e(G)) = f0(1).
Now fix n and assume that for every network G with fewer than n players there is a strategy which
achieves long-run payoffs greater than or equal to f0(e(G)), irrespective of the initial state.
Let G be a network with n myopic players that belongs to G0. Let M ∈ K0(G) be an independent
set of N0(G) with cardinality e(G) = e(G) and consider the strategy s0 ∈ S0 defined by
s0(x) =
{
0 if I1(x) ⊆M,
1 otherwise.
It is shown in the proof of Proposition 5.2 that s0 achieves long-run payoffs equal to f0(e(G)) irrespective
of the initial state.
Now let G be a network with n myopic players that does not belong to G0 and let some state
(x0, j) ∈ Ω be given. Let x1 = βj(x0). If B(x1) 6= ∅, then, by the induction hypothesis, the farsighted
player has a strategy for the network G |I0\NB(x1)(G) which achieves long-run payoffs greater than or
equal to u(G |I0\NB(x1)(G)) = f0(e(G |I0\NB(x1)(G))). Since effort levels of players in B(x
1) are unaffected,
this strategy can be applied to the network G in a straightforward way and achieves long-run payoffs
greater than or equal to
u(G |I0\NB(x1)(G)) = f0(e(G |I0\NB(x1)(G))) ≥ f0( minx∈Xb e(G |Iu0 (x))) = f0(e(G)),
where the inequality follows from the fact that any blocking profile in G |I0\NB(x1)(G) can be extended
to a blocking profile in G in the straightforward way.
Consider the case B(x1) = ∅. Let the farsighted player use a strategy s0 ∈ S0 which is such that, for
every x ∈ X with B(x) = ∅, s0(x) = 1 if x(N0(G)) > 0 and s0(x) = 0 if x(N0(G)) = 0. Let s = (s0, bI).
We show that under s an effort profile with a non-empty closed partnership can be reached from x1
after which the proof follows along the same lines as in the previous paragraph.
We first show that there is y ∈ Rs(x1) with y0 = 0 and y(N0(G)) = 0. If x1(N0(G)) = 0, then let
player 0 update and we are done. If x1(N0(G)) > 0, then let player 0 update first, leading to a profile
35
x2 with x20 = 1. Next let all players i ∈ N0(G) with x2i > 0 update sequentially, ultimately leading to a
profile x3 with x3(N0(G)) = 0. Then let player 0 update to generate the desired effort profile.
Let y ∈ X be an effort profile with y0 = 0 and y(N0(G)) = 0. If, for every i ∈ I, yi = 0, then
choose a player j1 ∈ I \ N0(G) to update. For the resulting effort profile y1 = βj1(y) it holds that
B(y1) = {j1}, so a closed partnership has been reached.
If there are myopic players with positive contributions, then let all these players sequentially update
until they all play best responses at a profile y2, see Proposition 4.3. There is at least one player with a
positive contribution at y2, so B(y2) 6= ∅. If B(y2) 6= ∅, then we are done. Otherwise, let j2 be a neighbor
of B(y2) with cj2(y
2) < 1. Let j2 absorb the set of players J = Nj2(G) ∩ B(y2) as in Proposition 4.4
and denote the resulting effort profile by y3, so y3j2 = 1 and y
3(Nj2(G)) = 0. If j
2 ∈ I \ N0(G), then
B(y3) = {j2}, so we are done. If j2 ∈ N0(G), then notice first that cj2(y2) < 1 implies B(y2) \ J 6= ∅.
Let 0 be the next updating player, followed by j2, followed by 0, reaching a profile y4 with y40 = y
4
j2 = 0.
Next let all myopic players with positive contributions at y4 sequentially update until they all play best
responses at a profile y5, see Proposition 4.3. We have that ∅ 6= B(y5) ( B(y2). Now repeating this
argument a finite number of times will eventually result in an effort profile with a non-empty closed
partnership. 
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